|
The actual
Is only the actual
In one place
And one time.
|
“Young Scholar” Xu Mangyao 1989 Oil on canvas 39" x 32" Xu Mangyao, whose hyper-realist figurative works have brought him world-wide attention over the past decade, was born in Shanghai in 1945. He began his study of art at the Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts Preparatory School when he was seventeen. in 1980 he graduated with a Masters degree in Fine Arts from the Zhejiang Academy where he remained as an instructor through 1984. From 1984—1986 he studied at the Pierre Cardin Studio, Paris. His work has been exhibited in Europe and the United States. He is currently a professor and artist in residence at the China National Academy of Fine Arts, Hangzhou. |
| Stanford
Studies on Daoism Dao and Names: The Laozi or Daode Jing Impact of the School of Names As noted, one stark difference between the two main texts of Daoism is the relation to the School of Names. The Laozi, though clearly using a theory of naming, betrays no exposure to the doctrines nor the analytical terminology developed by the dialectical Mohists for dealing with theory of language. The Zhuangzi, just as clearly, does. So to understand this next phase in the reconstructed development of Daoism, we must note briefly what the issues were and how they were formulated so we can see the implications of Daoist responses -- particularly those found in the Zhuangzi. The focus on analysis of language (ancient Chinese thinkers tended to treat all words as names) grows out of a recognition of the classical "rectifying names" problem we drew attention to above in explaining the Laozi. The disputes about dao are intimately tied to issues about language -- how it works and, in particular, what is to count as a correct use or interpretation of words found in familiar examples of guidance -- in discourse daos. The early Mohists found themselves committed to using their utilitarianism in determining the correct use of words as well as in action. "Which dao should we follow" becomes "which words shall we use in socialization, in what order, and under what practical interpretation?" In effect, the early Mohist answer to all three questions is settled by reference to making an allegedly "natural" distinction between benefit and harm. Thus language conventions themselves should be governed by the utility principle. Later Mohists formulated a more "realistic" theory of what counts as the normatively correct way to use names. We should mark the distinctions that underlie names in ways that trace patterns of objective similarity and difference in things. This realism governs the correct ways both to use terms and to interpret them. We rely on utility to determine how we structure terms into strings in guidance -- in discourse dao . So, for example, a thief is a man -- governed by the rules of similarity. But we still allow guidance that includes both the guiding strings "don't kill men" and "you may kill thieves." This realism led the later Mohists to linguistic conclusions that challenged any anti-language attitude -- including those expressed by early Daoists. First, the later Mohists argued that in any disagreement about how to distinguish using a name, there was a right answer -- even though it may be hard to know or prove. So, for example, if we are disputing about whether to use "ox" or "non-ox" of some obscure object, one of the answers will be correct. This undermines both the nihilistic and the anti-language options to understanding Laozi. Second, Mohists argued that any attempt to formulate the anti-language position was self condemning. "All language is bad" must be a "bad" thing to say. Other figures classified in the School of Names responded to the Mohist realists. Gongsun Long (mentioned sporadically in the Zhuangzi) took himself to be defending Confucian accounts of rectifying names and Hui Shi constructs what looks like a relativist challenge to Later Mohist accounts. We will look only at Hui Shi's account here because he plays such a significant role in the text of the Zhuangzi . Hui Shi implicitly addressed the claim that the correct use of words depends on objective patterns of similarity and difference. What we know of his writings (which the Zhuangzi history suggests were truly prodigious) is mainly a sequence of theses cited in at same Zhuangzi history. These focused on propositions about comparative "names" -- e.g., large and small. Clearly some things properly termed ‘large’ are objectively smaller than other things properly called ‘small.’ A small elephant is considerably larger than a huge ant! So correct naming must not be based on objective distinctions in the world, but on our projections from a point of view or purpose in using them. Similarly, ‘tall’, ‘short’, and time words (e.g., ‘before’ and ‘after’, ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’) are implausibly attributed to objective distinctions From this, according to the list of propositions in the Zhuangzi history, Hui Shi apparently concluded that we can speak of a great "one" that is a kind of everything concept -- nothing lies outside it and of a small "one" which cannot be further distinguished or divided. Objectively there are no distinctions -- the cosmos is one, and we should direct the same guiding attitudes toward the whole -- "love all things equally." |